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TAXATION-FEDERAL lNcoME TAX-TAXABILITY To NoNRESIDENT AiIEN
OF LuMP SuM PAYMENTS FOR COPYRIGHT-Taxpayer, a nonresident alien
author not engaged in trade or business within the United States, delivered
certain literary works to American publishers under agreement whereby the
latter were to copyright and publish these stories and reassign to the taxpayer
after publication all rights except the ~erican serial rights. Lump sum payments for each story were received during the years 1938 and 1941. No tax
was paid on these amounts and a deficiency was assessed on the ground that
they constituted royalties received for the use of United States copyrights and
were taxable as ordinary income. The circuit court of appeals sustained the
taxpayer's contention that the payments were proceeds from the sale of personal
property and therefore exempt under Section 211 (a) (I) (A) of the Internal
Revenue Code.1 On certiorari · to the Supreme Court, hel.d,. reversed .. Justices
Frankfurter, Murphy and Jackson dissented. Commissioner of Internal 1Revemte
v. Wodehouse, 335 U.S. 807, 69 S.Ct. 1J20 (1949).
For the purposes of determining the right to sue for an infring~ment in
copyright cases, courts have adopted the theory that a copyright is indivisible,
and that an assignment of less than . all of the rights represented by a copyright does not confer legal title upon the assignee, but is merely the granting
of a license. 2 Although originally limited in application to matters of pro-

v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 4th, 1948) 166 F. (2d) 986.
M. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amusement Co., (D.C. S.C., 1924) 298 F. 470,
affd., (C.C.A. 4th, 1924) 2 F. (2d) 1020; BALL, Tim LAw OF COPYRIGHT AND Lrn:!RARY
PROPERTY 539 (1944); AMDUR, COPYRIGHT LAw AND PRACTICE 790 (1936). That this rule
is not unanimous, see Roberts v. Myers, (C.C. Mass., 1860) 20 F. Cas. 898. The pro1 Wodehouse
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cedure, the indivisibility doctrine has been extended to tax cases. On this basis,
courts have characterized proceeds from the exclusive and irrevocable assignment of partial rights under a copyright as ordinary income and not gains
from the sale of property.3 This application of the rule is clearly untenable
when the real nature of copyrights is considered and business realities recog~
nized. Under the ''bundle of rights" concept of property, the several parts of a
copyright are property rights which can be individually transferred so as to
confer all the incidences of legal ownership upon a grantee.4 This fact has
been recognized in the literary world where these different rights are invariably
transferred separately in transactions treated and spoken of as sales. Reliance
upon the indivisibility doctrine is especially difficult to justify in view of the
well-accepted principle that tax law is concerned with substance, not form
and technical refinements of title.5 On this analysis, the decision of the circuit
court in the principal case seems uncontrovertible. A majority of the Supreme
Court failed to consider the propriety of the lower court's reasoning and held
the proceeds taxable solely on the grounds that legislative history and taxing
policy indicated Congressional intent to reach such readily collectible gains.6
This justification for upholding a tax in the principal case, however, does violence to the clear language of Section 211,7 whereby the gains of nonresident aliens
from sales of property are excluded from taxation. However, it must be noted
that this analysis does not, in itself, benefit the American author or artist whose
tax burden is lightened only if the sale involves a capital asset. There is authority for the proposition that partial rights under a copyright, when held by a
professional author, constitute "property held ... primarily for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of his trade or business .. .''8 and therefore are not capital
assets.9 It would seem that more equitable treatment should be accorded our
creative artists, whose incomes are variable and irregular, by recognizing that
the exclusive and irrevocable assignment of any one of the rights embraced
by a copyright results in a capital gain. Since a judicial declaration to this effect
cedural necessity for the rule has been vitiated by the decision in Independent Wireless
Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corporation of America, 269 U.S. 459, 46 S.Ct. 166 (1926),
where it was held that an exclusive licensee under a patent could sue for infringement by
joining the patent owner.
3 Rohmer v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 2d, 1946) 153 F. (2d) 61; Goldsmith v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 2d, 1944) 143 F. (2d) 466; Sabat4ri v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 2d,
1938) 98 F. (2d) 753. But see the concurring opinion of Judge L. Hand in Goldsmith v.
Commissioner, supra, note 3, where it was concluded that an exclusive and irrevocable
assignment of movie rights was a sale.
4 Fulda, "Copyright Assignments and the Capital Gains Tax," 58 YALB L. J. 245
(1949); 54 YALE L. J. 879 (1945).
5 Griffiths v. Commisisoner, 308 U.S. 355, 60 S.Ct. 277 (1939); Corliss v. Bowers, 281
U.S. 376, 50 S.Ct. 336 (1930).
6 Principal case at 1130.
7 26 U.S.C.A. Int. Rev. Code, 211 (a).
s 26 U.S.C.A. Int. Rev. Code, 117 (a) (1).
9 Concurring opinion in Goldsmith v. Commissioner, note 3, supra.
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is unlikely in view of the decision in the principal case, this result can be
achieved only through an amendment to the code.10

Myron ]. Nadler, S.Ed.

10 Schulman, "The Artist and His Tax Burden," 27 TAXES 101 (1949); Swartz,
"Authors and the Federal Income Tax," 26 TAXEs 51 (1948). A bill, attaching the
benefits of a capital gains transaction to assignments of movie rights only, has been introduced in Congress. H.R. 5562, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 1948. This proposal should be extended to encompass all of the rights represented by a copyright, however, if it is to provide
an effective solution to the problem.

